书名: Laws and Other Worlds: A Humean Account of Laws and Counterfactuals (The Western Ontario Series in Philosophy of Science)
作者: Fred Wilson (Author)
出版社: Springer; 1 edition (October 31, 1986)
语言: English
ISBN-10: 9027722323
ISBN-13: 978-9027722324
电子书格式：DJVU, 推荐查看工具：WinDjView
From Preface (p. ix-x):
Problems in the philosophy of language have the habit of not remaining just such problems. The problem of counterfactuals has been a standing problem in the philosophy of language ever since the classic discussions of Chisholm ('The Contrary-to-Fact Conditional') and Goodman (The Problem of Counterfactual Conditionals') — though the problems had been discussed by philosophers such as Hume, J. S. Mill and Bradley, and even, in his own way, by Aristotle. There has been a tendency recently for approaches to the problem of counterfactuals to divide into two streams. In fact, the two streams are there at the origin of the contemporary discussions. One stream derives from Chisholm's approach and takes its inspiration from modal logic and set theory. Often enough this approach involves — as with Aristotle — an assumption of non-truth-functional connectives to define unanalyzable natural necessities, or defines such connectives and such necessities in terms of an ontology of possible worlds. The other stream derives from Goodman's approach and takes its inspiration from philosophy of science, most often an empiricist philosophy of science.
From the approach of modal logic, the empiricist philosophy of science is far too meagre in its resources to adequately analyze the logic and semantics of counterfactuals. From the approach of empiricist philosophy of science, ontologies of natural necessities and possible worlds are far too problematic to provide a philosophically adequate account of counterfactuals.
The present essay firmly locates itself in the second stream, arguing, on the one hand, that the other approach is philosophically inadequate and incapable of analyzing counterfactual conditionals, while arguing on the other hand that an analysis flowing from an empiricist philosophy of science can adequately solve the problem of counterfactuals.
This essay is written in the conviction that there are no necessities other than the logical and no worlds other than the actual.
It defends a Humean account of laws against the natural necessities of the rationalists. It analyzes counterfactual conditionals as condensed arguments in which Humean laws function as major premisses. It defends this analysis of counterfactual conditionals against those who argue that the logic of such conditionals can be adequately explicated only in terms of an ontology of possible worlds.
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作者: Fred Wilson (Author)
出版社: Springer; 1 edition (October 31, 1986)
语言: English
ISBN-10: 9027722323
ISBN-13: 978-9027722324
电子书格式：DJVU, 推荐查看工具：WinDjView
From Preface (p. ix-x):
Problems in the philosophy of language have the habit of not remaining just such problems. The problem of counterfactuals has been a standing problem in the philosophy of language ever since the classic discussions of Chisholm ('The Contrary-to-Fact Conditional') and Goodman (The Problem of Counterfactual Conditionals') — though the problems had been discussed by philosophers such as Hume, J. S. Mill and Bradley, and even, in his own way, by Aristotle. There has been a tendency recently for approaches to the problem of counterfactuals to divide into two streams. In fact, the two streams are there at the origin of the contemporary discussions. One stream derives from Chisholm's approach and takes its inspiration from modal logic and set theory. Often enough this approach involves — as with Aristotle — an assumption of non-truth-functional connectives to define unanalyzable natural necessities, or defines such connectives and such necessities in terms of an ontology of possible worlds. The other stream derives from Goodman's approach and takes its inspiration from philosophy of science, most often an empiricist philosophy of science.
From the approach of modal logic, the empiricist philosophy of science is far too meagre in its resources to adequately analyze the logic and semantics of counterfactuals. From the approach of empiricist philosophy of science, ontologies of natural necessities and possible worlds are far too problematic to provide a philosophically adequate account of counterfactuals.
The present essay firmly locates itself in the second stream, arguing, on the one hand, that the other approach is philosophically inadequate and incapable of analyzing counterfactual conditionals, while arguing on the other hand that an analysis flowing from an empiricist philosophy of science can adequately solve the problem of counterfactuals.
This essay is written in the conviction that there are no necessities other than the logical and no worlds other than the actual.
It defends a Humean account of laws against the natural necessities of the rationalists. It analyzes counterfactual conditionals as condensed arguments in which Humean laws function as major premisses. It defends this analysis of counterfactual conditionals against those who argue that the logic of such conditionals can be adequately explicated only in terms of an ontology of possible worlds.
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